Judges and legal scholars have long observed that public confidence in the federal judiciary is essential to its functioning. Federal courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States, have limited powers to ensure compliance with their decisions. While courts may punish disobedience by using the contempt power, for example, this remedy does not by itself guarantee compliance. A strong belief in the rule of law and respect for the courts as fair and impartial arbiters has historically resulted in substantial compliance with court orders by government officials and the general public. On rare occasions, however, court decisions have engendered such controversy as to inspire defiance. In these cases, the courts may turn to the executive branch for assistance in enforcing their orders.

Whether the executive is obligated to enforce final court judgments has remained a matter of debate. While such an obligation may be inferred from Article II’s command that the president “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” or from the overall constitutional structure, the question has not been resolved. Appealing to the executive branch for help has not been a viable strategy, therefore, when the chief executive has strongly opposed a court ruling. On at least two notable occasions, federal court decisions have been rendered unenforceable as a result of a president’s refusal to accept them. In Worcester v. Georgia (1832), the Supreme Court overturned the conviction of a missionary living among the Cherokee Nation for refusing to take an oath to obey the laws of Georgia. In an opinion written by Chief Justice John Marshall, the Court held that the Cherokees constituted an independent political community to which the state of Georgia could not apply its laws. Accordingly, the Court ordered Worcester’s release from custody.

Georgia’s governor refused to release the missionary, vowing to defy the Court’s decision. President Andrew Jackson refused to intervene, maintaining that Georgia had the right to apply its laws to any person living within its borders. Jackson also embraced the view that both the executive and legislative branches had as much right as the judicial branch to interpret the Constitution. While the story is likely apocryphal, Jackson supposedly remarked, “John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it.” (The quotation is believed to have first appeared in an 1864 book by newspaper publisher Horace Greeley.) Eventually, Jackson acted in direct contravention of the Court’s decision in Worcester. Ignoring the Court’s ruling that the Cherokees were an independent people entitled to the land on which they lived, Jackson sent federal troops to evict them. The result was the Cherokees’ forced and deadly migration west along the infamous Trail of Tears.

In 1861, another Chief Justice, Roger Taney, found himself in a showdown with the president over a judicial ruling. Early in the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln authorized his military commanders to suspend the writ of habeas corpus along troop transport routes between Philadelphia and Washington, D.C. Military authorities arrested John Merryman, a Maryland farmer, who had allegedly committed acts of sabotage against Union troops. In response to a petition from Merryman, Taney issued a writ of habeas corpus commanding General George Cadwalader to produce Merryman in court and explain the justification for his detention.

General Cadwalader ignored the writ, refusing to bring Merryman to court and, in response to another order from Taney, declined to appear by himself. In his opinion in Ex parte Merryman Taney declared that in suspending the writ, Lincoln had overstepped his constitutional authority by exercising a power that belonged solely to Congress. Taney recognized, however, that with the military certain to ignore any order he might issue, his ruling could not be enforced without the president’s cooperation. Ordering that a copy of the opinion be sent to Lincoln, Taney noted, “It will then remain for that high officer … to determine what actions he will take to cause the civil process of the United States to be respected and enforced.” Lincoln paid no heed to Taney’s opinion and continued to maintain that he had the authority to suspend habeas corpus. In 1863, Congress explicitly authorized the president to suspend habeas corpus but mandated that executive branch officials supply the federal courts with the names of those detained and that prisoners not indicted by the end of the court’s term be released.

While Worcester and Merryman posed serious challenges to the enforceability of judgments, some of the most sustained and violent efforts to delegitimize and disobey the mandates of the courts occurred in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education. In response to the Court holding racial segregation of public schools unconstitutional, southern segregationists coined the rallying cry “Massive Resistance.” State officials’ defiance of Brown was a crisis for federalism unlike any since the Civil War, forcing the executive branch to reassert the supremacy of federal law. On a few occasions, presidents authorized the use of military force to counter the massive resistance strategy and achieve compliance with a federal court order.

Perhaps the most famous case of presidential intervention to enforce a court order occurred in 1957, when President Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered the U.S. Army’s 101^st Airborne Division to Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas. The state’s governor, Orval Faubus, interfered with Little Rock’s court-approved school desegregation plan, under which a group of African American students (later called the “Little Rock Nine”) were to attend the formerly all-white Central High. Faubus first sought and received a state-court order halting desegregation, but the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas quickly invalidated the order on the grounds that it conflicted with federal law. Next, Faubus dispatched the Arkansas National Guard to the school to block the African American students’ entry. After a hearing, the federal district court ordered the governor to cease obstructing the desegregation of Central High. Faubus relented and reluctantly withdrew the Guard, but by this point, a large and angry mob of white segregationists had assembled outside of Central High, threatening the safety of the African American students and the orderly operation of the school.

The mayor of Little Rock sent a telegram to the White House asking for assistance. Eisenhower was reluctant to intervene, believing that education was a state and local matter, and that enforcing desegregation by force might only lead to more violence against civil rights advocates. Nevertheless, the president realized that if he did not act, the mandate of the Supreme Court’s Brown decision and the Arkansas federal court’s desegregation order would be of no effect in Little Rock, threatening the supremacy of federal law. At the urging of Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Eisenhower issued a statement proclaiming, “The Federal law and orders of a United States District Court implementing that law cannot be flouted with impunity by an individual or any mob of extremists,” and promising to use “whatever force may be necessary” to enforce the law.

The president then ordered the 101^st Airborne Division, made famous by their heroic exploits in World War II, to Little Rock. Eisenhower did so under the authority of two federal statutes. One, which had existed in various forms since 1795, allowed the domestic use of military force when, in the president’s judgment, defiance of federal authority made it “impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings.” The other, stemming from the Civil Rights Act of 1871—an anti-Ku Klux Klan measure—applied when resistance to the law deprived a class of people of constitutional rights which the state was unwilling or unable to protect. Acting at Eisenhower’s behest, the troops held back the crowd and escorted the Little Rock Nine into the school, ending the standoff.

Eisenhower’s order did not permanently solve the segregation problem in Little Rock. The school board sought to suspend its desegregation program, litigating the issue in federal court until the Supreme Court ruled against it in Cooper v. Aaron (1958). Governor Faubus then closed the city’s public schools to avoid proceeding with integration. In 1959, however, a new school board voted to reopen the schools on an integrated basis. The president’s action, while not providing a final resolution, was nevertheless deeply significant. By sending troops to Little Rock, Eisenhower reinforced the supremacy of federal law and demonstrated that the orders of federal courts could not be ignored without consequences. These principles remained essential as the battle to desegregate public schools continued.

President John F. Kennedy followed Eisenhower’s example, extending executive branch assistance to enforce desegregation orders on three separate occasions. The first involved the 1962 case of Meredith v. Fair, in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that James Meredith had been denied admission to the University of Mississippi (commonly known as “Ole Miss”) because he was African American. The court reversed the decision of a U.S. district court denying Meredith relief and enjoined state authorities from preventing Meredith’s admission to the university. Echoing Orval Faubus, Mississippi governor Ross Barnett insisted that Mississippi would not desegregate its schools, going as far as to personally block Meredith’s entrance to a university building. Attorney General Robert Kennedy then sent a large group of U.S. marshals to accompany Meredith, but state officials continued to block his entry, preventing him from registering.   

The Fifth Circuit found Barnett in contempt of court. Chief Judge Elbert Tuttle next wrote to the Justice Department saying that there was little more the court could do to enforce its desegregation order. “[T]he time has about come … when the burden now falls on the Executive Branch of the Government,” he wrote. President Kennedy, like Eisenhower before him, was reluctant to use force, believing that the situation could be resolved peacefully. On September 30, 1962, however, the situation at Ole Miss escalated into a full-fledged riot as a mob of over 2,000 people attacked federal marshals, reporters, photographers, and others. After a final appeal to Barnett to restore law and order failed, the president reached the conclusion that he had no other choice but to dispatch federal troops. A unit of the Mississippi National Guard, which Kennedy had ordered to be federalized, became a target for attack and was unable to quell the riot. Not until early the next morning, after a lengthy logistical delay, did U.S. Army forces arrive and put an end to the turmoil that had engulfed the campus. That day, James Meredith enrolled at Ole Miss, becoming the first African American student to do so.

A similar situation played out at the University of Alabama in June 1963, when Governor George Wallace defied an order of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama prohibiting him from blocking the enrollment of African American students. Kennedy issued an executive order federalizing the Alabama National Guard and permitting the use of federal troops, if necessary, to enforce the court’s order. Unlike the enrollment of James Meredith at Ole Miss, this incident was resolved without violence. When the students, Vivian Malone and James Hood, arrived for registration, Wallace stood in the doorway to block their entry. After denouncing the federal government’s actions in what became known as the “Stand in the Schoolhouse Door Speech,” Wallace obeyed the National Guard’s order to step aside, allowing Malone and Hood to enroll at the university.  

Wallace was not finished in his attempt to thwart the desegregation of Alabama schools, however. In September 1963, the governor ordered local authorities not to permit African American children to attend all-white public schools in Mobile, Tuskegee, and Birmingham. In response, five judges of the U.S. District Courts for the Northern, Middle, and Southern Districts of Alabama signed a restraining order against Wallace, commanding him to cease his interference with integration. Wallace refused to back down, however, ordering the Alabama National Guard to surround the schools to prevent the entrance of African American students. Once again, Kennedy saw that the courts’ orders could not be enforced without executive branch assistance. In this case, the remedy was not to send troops, but instead to remove them. Echoing his actions in Mississippi, Kennedy federalized the Alabama National Guard. Once under federal control, the Guard was ordered to disperse. Wallace was forced to concede defeat, and integration of the schools proceeded. 

While federal court decisions have frequently involved controversy, the circumstances outlined in this essay are notable exceptions to the general rule. In nearly all cases, judicial decisions have been respected as the law of the land. On rare occasions, widespread disobedience to court orders has threatened to weaken the credibility of the federal judiciary, challenge its status as an independent branch of government, and undermine the rule of law. The president’s power to assist in the enforcement of court orders is therefore a significant part of the relationship between the executive and judicial branches, but one that is invoked only in the most extreme circumstances.

Further Reading:
Breyer, Stephen. Making Our Democracy Work: A Judge’s View. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2011.

Crusto, Mitchell F. “Federalism and Civil Rights: The Meredith Case.” National Black Law Journal 11, no. 2 (1989): 233–248.

Diamond, Raymond T. “Confrontation as Rejoinder to Compromise: Reflections on the Little Rock Desegregation Crisis.” National Black Law Journal 11, no. 2 (1989): 151–176.

Tillman, Seth Barrett. “Ex Parte Merryman: Myth, History, and Scholarship.” Military Law Review 224, no. 2 (2016): 481–540.