Note: The text and descriptions of many of the statutes establishing the structure of the federal judiciary are available on the Federal Judicial Center website at "Landmark Judicial Legislation."

Debates on the Judiciary Act of 1789

1. Representative James Jackson of Georgia, in support of a motion to omit district courts from the plan for the federal judiciary, August 29, 1789.

The Constitution does not absolutely require inferior jurisdictions: It says, that "the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." The word may is not positive, and it remains with Congress to determine what inferior jurisdictions are necessary, and what they will ordain and establish, for if they chuse, or think no inferior jurisdictions necessary, there is no obligation to establish them. It then remains with the Legislature of the Union to examine the necessity or expediency of those courts only. Sir, on the subject of expediency, I for my part, cannot see it, for I am of opinion that the State courts will answer every judiciary purpose. . . .

I hold that the harmony of the people, their liberties and properties will be more secure under the legal paths of their ancestors, under their modes of trial, and known methods of decision. They have heretofore been accustomed to receive justice at their own doors in a simple form. The system before the house has a round of courts, appellate from one to the other, and the poor man that is engaged with a rich opponent, will be harassed in the most cruel manner, and although the sum be limited for appeals, yet, Sir, the poor individual may have a legal right to a sum superior to that limitation, say above a certain amount of dollars, and not possess fortune sufficient to carry on his law suit: He must sink under the oppression of his richer neighbor. I am clearly of opinion that the people would much rather have but one appeal, and which in my opinion would answer every purpose: I mean from the State courts, immediately to the supreme court of the continent.

[Document Source: Documentary History of the First Federal Congress , vol. 11, Debates in the House of Representatives, First Session: June-September 1789 . Eds., Bickford, Bowling, and Veit. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992. 1353-54.]

2. Representative Fisher Ames of Massachusetts, in opposition to a motion to omit district courts from the plan for a federal judiciary, August 29, 1789.

A government which may make, but not enforce laws, cannot last long, nor do much good. By this power too, the people are gainers. The administration of justice is the very performance of the social bargain on the part of government. It is the reward of their toils-the equivalent for what they surrender. They have to plant, to water, to manure the tree, and this is the fruit of it. The argument therefore, a priori, is strong against the motion, for while it weakens the government it defrauds the people. We live in a time of innovation; but until miracles shall become more common than ordinary events; and surprize us less than the usual course of nature, I shall think it a wonderful felicity of invention to propose the expedient of hiring out our judicial power, and employing courts not amenable to our laws, instead of instituting them ourselves as the constitution requires. We might as properly negociate and assign over our legislative as our judicial power; and it is not more strange to get the laws made for this body than after their passage to get them interpreted and executed by those, whom we do not appoint, and cannot controul.

[Document Source: Documentary History of the First Federal Congress , vol. 11, Debates in the House of Representatives, First Session: June-September 1789 . Eds., Bickford, Bowling, and Veit. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992. 1356-57.]

Debates on the Repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801

3. Senator Abraham Baldwin of Georgia, in favor of repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801 and the restoration of circuit duties for Supreme Court justices, January 15, 1802.

In taking a general look at the two systems, the strongest point of distinction which seizes the first view, is, that in the old system the same judges hold the Supreme Court here, and a court in each of the States, with the exception of the States over the mountains; in the new system, now proposed to be repealed, this is not the case; the courts in the several States are held by different judges. This had ever appeared to him a radical and vital failure in the new system; it deprives judges of the opportunity of a full knowledge of local laws and usages, and destroys the possibility of uniformity; it is also a main artery of healthful circulation in the body politic. In giving a satisfactory administration of a Government over a country of this vast extent, the great object must be to avoid the necessity of dragging the people from the remote extremes, the distance of thousands of miles, to the seat of our Government, or far from their homes, where they cannot have the usual advantages in courts of justice. While two of the judges of the Supreme Court held a court in each State, this was almost entirely avoided, except in some of the largest States. The suits were rarely determined at the first court; at the second court, the judges were considered as bringing the sense of the Supreme Court on the subject; it seemed to give as satisfactory a conclusion to the business as if the parties had been themselves before the Supreme Court.

[Document Source: 7th Cong., 1st sess., Jan. 15, 1802, Annals of Congress , vol. 11, 102-03.]

4. Representative John Stanly of North Carolina, in opposition to the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801, February 18, 1802.

Under the former system, there were six judges of the Supreme Court of the United States, who held two sessions of the Supreme Court in each year, at the seat of Government. Those judges also held in each State a circuit court, two terms in each year. . . . From the errors of this system resulted, first, a delay of justice. The judges bound to hold courts in succession at remote parts of the continent, were continually travelling; from the variety of accidents to which travellers are subjected in this country, from the condition of roads and overflowing of rivers, it frequently happened that the judges failed in their attempts to get to the courts, or arrived so late that little business was done. Suitors, jurors, and witnesses, were subjected to the trouble and expense of attending courts without the accomplishment of their business; hence resulted a delay of justice. . . .

Another great evil resulting from that system was, its tendency to lessen the character and respectability of the Federal bench. Those best acquainted with the profession of the law will most readily admit, that even a life of patient study is unequal to the complete attainment of principles and rules; and that much labor and industry are necessary to preserve that which is gained. Consequently, that extent of legal knowledge, correctness of judgment, and respectability of character, which should designate the persons qualified for this important trust were seldom to be found, but in men far advanced in years. Men possessing these qualifications, not inured to labor, are seldom equal to the fatigue of their duty; or, if at the time of appointment, fast approaching to the infirmities of age, were not to be expected to relinquish the enjoyments of private life for an office, which, however honorable, subjected them to the fatigue of a day laborer. The office, with its incumbrances, was, as it were, offered to the lowest bidder. And men best qualified to honor the bench, were driven from it.

[Document Source: 7th Cong., 1st sess., Feb. 18, 1802, Annals of Congress , vol. 11, 569-70.]

Debates on Circuit Riding

5. Representative Daniel Webster of Massachusetts, in defense of the circuit duties of Supreme Court justices, January 4, 1826.

In the first place, it appears to me that such an intercourse as the Judges of the Supreme Court are enabled to have with the Profession, and with the People, in their respective Circuits, is itself an object of no inconsiderable importance. It naturally inspires respect and confidence, and it communicates and reciprocates information through all the branches of the Judicial Department. This leads to a harmony of opinion and of action. The Supreme Court is, itself, in some measure, insulated; it has not frequent occasions of contact with the community. The Bar that attends it is neither numerous, nor regular in its attendance. The gentlemen who appear before it, in the character of counsel, come for the occasion, and depart with the occasion. The Profession is occupied mainly in the objects which engage it in its own domestic forums; it belongs to the States; and their tribunals furnish its constant and principal theatre. If the Judges of the Supreme Court, therefore, are wholly withdrawn from the Circuits, it appears to me there is danger of leaving them without the means of useful intercourse with other Judicial characters, with the Profession of which they are members, and with the public. But, without pursuing these general reflections, I would say, in the second place, that I think it useful that Judges should see in practice the operation and effect of their own decisions. This will prevent theory from running too far, or refining too much.

[Document Source: 19th Cong., 1st sess., Jan. 4, 1826, Register of Debates , vol. 2, 877-78.]

Debates on the Establishment of Courts of Appeals

6. Views of the Minority, U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, August 8, 1890.

It is not perceived by the undersigned upon what principle it is that all cases in which the jurisdiction of the national courts is invoked by citizens of different States, aliens, etc., are excluded from review by the Supreme Court. The Constitution puts suits of that character upon the same footing as suits drawing in question the Constitution of the United States and the laws of Congress-as being entitled to the same judicial consideration of the national authority as the others, and for very obvious reasons. The judicial establishment of the United States was created for the purpose of defending and enforcing all rights (and in an equal degree) existing under the national character of the Union; and it was thought, undoubtedly, that among the most important of these was that of protecting a citizen of one State against any local bias that might exist against him in another and distant community.

This, we think was and is even more important than the consideration by a national court of subjects arising in respect of the construction and effect of the Constitution or of a national law; for, in the absence of any local bias, it may be justly supposed that the local court, whether State or national, would be likely to decide such questions impartially, and on the whole correctly; while in the case of local bias, it may, at least to a certain extent, just as well exist in a national court administering the laws in a particular community, as in a State court. We believe, therefore, that the Supreme Court ought to have jurisdiction to review cases arising in the national courts in the various States when their jurisdiction has been invoked on the ground of citizenship or alienage quite as much as in cases where the jurisdiction is not thus invoked, but depends upon the construction of the Constitution or a law.

We are compelled to think, therefore, that the attempt made in the scheme of the majority of the committee to diminish the number of causes coming to the Supreme Court is, in the respect before referred to, arbitrary, and not defensible upon any consideration other than the necessity of finding some means for a more rapid disposition of causes in that court. We believe it to be important to the best interests of the whole people in every part of the Republic that every suitor in the courts of the United States should have an equal right to take the judgment of the highest court of the Union upon his particular case, be it great or small. If there be an overruling necessity to limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in order that justice may be finally and speedily administered, of course that necessity must be yielded to and provision made accordingly. But we think that the Supreme Court may, without excluding from its consideration any case that now by law may be brought to it, dispose speedily of all causes that may be upon its calendar from year to year, without any exclusion of any class of cases of which it now has appellate jurisdiction. We think this can be done, as in one form or another it is done in the States and in other countries, by providing that the Supreme Court shall hear causes coming to its appellate jurisdiction by acting in separate divisions of three or more justices, and, thus going on with three hearings at the same time.

[Document Source: Senate Judiciary Committee, Views of the Minority , 51st Cong., 1st sess., 1890, S. Rep. 1571, 2-3.]

7. Remarks of Senator Joseph Norton Dolph of Oregon, September 19, 1890.

To force a litigant into the Federal courts to-day to await the long-delayed decision of the court of last resort is equivalent to a denial of justice. What is the plain, imperative duty of Congress in the premises? It is to provide adequate judicial machinery for the prompt transaction of the business of the Federal courts. If this is not done, these courts, instead of answering the great and beneficial purpose of their creation and affording speedy and impartial justice to litigants, will become, if they have not already become, by reason of the inadequacy of the judicial system and the long delay to which litigants are subjected, instruments of oppression and wrong, the means of denying justice to meritorious litigants in many instances forced into them for the purpose of delay.

[Document Source: 51st Cong., 1st sess., Sept. 19, 1890, Congressional Record , vol. 21, pt. 10, 10227.]

8. Remarks of Senator William Evarts of New York, September 19, 1890.

I have heard it said by persons in great authority that under this scheme, after this accumulation is once worked off, as we hope it may be by some extraordinary effort on the part of the court so as to bring about practically the benefits, a session of five months here might dispose of the docket, and that therefore these justices might be liberated for doing a share of judiciary duty in the courts of the first instance.

I do not know whether all the Senators will agree, but for myself I regard it as a great misfortune that judges in banc are also not brought in contact with the profession and the suitors and the people in the courts of first instance as frequently as possible. Now, I will imagine-for perhaps I can not call it more than imagination-that these circuit judges, who are to compose this tribunal in each of the circuit courts in their appellate function, will, as I think, be able to dispose of the annual litigation in three or four months, at such distribution of terms as they may think fit, and they would be left to take the very important part that they now take, and can not be spared, in my judgment, in the court of first instance in equity cases and in matters that belong to first hearings of all important matters.

I do not desire to see a severance between these appellate judges, which the scheme of the House operates between the judges of that court and the jurisdiction in the first instance of the litigation that the circuit judges now discharge.

[Document Source: 51st Cong., 1st sess., Sept. 19, 1890, Congressional Record , vol. 21, pt. 10, 10222.]

Administrative Reform of the Judiciary

9. Chief Justice William Howard Taft's Recommended Changes in Judicial Administration, Address to the Chicago Bar Association, 1921.

The three reforms, therefore, to which I invite your attention are, first, an increase in the judicial force in the trial Federal courts, and an organization and effective distribution of the force by a council of judges; second, simplicity of procedure in the trial Federal courts; and, third, a reduction in the obligatory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and an increase in the field of its discretionary jurisdiction by certiorari. It thus will remain the supreme revisory tribunal, but will be given sufficient control of the number and character of the cases which come before it, to enable it to remain the one Supreme Court and to keep up with its work. I venture to ask the members of the Bar of the United States and of this important Bar to aid the cause of justice by promoting the legislation which I have attempted to describe.

There is no field of governmental action so important to the people as our courts, and there is nothing in those courts so essential to the doing of justice as the prompt dispatch of business and the elimination from procedure of such requirements as will defeat the ends of justice through technicality and delay. While the Bar and the Bench are really much less responsible for delays in legal procedure than the public are likely to think, the very fact that they are popularly supposed to be responsible should make us act with energy to justify the existence of our profession and the maintenance of courts.

[Document Source: William Howard Taft, "Three Needed Steps of Progress," American Bar Association Journal 8 (January 1922): 34-36.]